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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Johnetta Nelson appeals from the district court's order 
of June 24, 1994, granting summary judgment to Upsala College and 
certain of its officials in this action alleging unlawful 
employment retaliation pursuant to section 704(a) of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), 
and state-law defamation.  In addition, Nelson challenges the 
district court's refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over her claims that Upsala and its representatives engaged in 
conduct constituting unlawful employment retaliation contrary to 
the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
10:5-12(d) (West Supp. 1994), and the New Jersey Conscientious 
Employee Protection Act, id. § 34:19-3(c) (West Supp. 1994). 
 The germane facts are not in dispute.1  Upsala is a 
small, private liberal arts college with a campus in East Orange, 
New Jersey.  Defendants Robert E. Karsten, Warren H. Funk, and 
George W. Freyberger are, respectively, the president, provost, 
and dean of students of Upsala.  As a matter of convenience we 
                     
1
.  We largely take the facts from the district court opinion.  
Nelson v. Upsala College, No. 92-1851 (D.N.J. June 24, 1994). 
  
usually will refer to the college and the individual defendants 
collectively as Upsala. 
 Upsala first employed Nelson, an African-American, in 
1979 as its part-time Gospel Choir Director.  In addition, Upsala 
has employed Nelson as a secretary in the Office of Dean of 
Students and the College Center Office.  At the beginning of the 
1990-1991 academic year, Upsala announced its intention to 
eliminate the position of choir director for budgetary reasons.  
When the choir's student participants objected, Upsala decided to 
fund the choir, but to convert it to an elective course for which 
students could receive academic credit.  This conversion meant 
that Upsala could not retain Nelson as the choir director because 
she did not possess a college degree, as required under Upsala's 
policy for faculty members teaching an accredited course.  
Consequently, Upsala terminated Nelson's employment as of October 
16, 1990. 
 Nelson then filed a discrimination charge with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") against Upsala 
alleging race discrimination.  Nelson and Upsala settled that 
claim, and on or about November 9, 1990, Upsala agreed to 
reinstate Nelson to a terminal contract for the 1990-91 academic 
year.  The EEOC then dismissed Nelson's claim. 
 In accordance with the settlement agreement, Upsala 
designated Nelson as director of the "extra-curricular 
designated" Gospel Choir, and she continued in that position 
until her terminal contract expired on May 3, 1991.  During the 
spring of 1991 a search committee chose Beverly Owens, an 
  
African-American with both a bachelor degree and master of arts 
degree in music performance, as the new choir director.  Upsala 
planned that the choir would become a course for credit during 
the 1991-1992 academic year.   
 Following the expiration of Nelson's terminal contract 
a number of incidents led to this action.  On or about September 
18, 1991, Nelson attended a gathering on the Upsala campus.  
Freyberger was at the meeting and saw Nelson.  However, neither 
Freyberger nor anyone else asked Nelson to leave the campus or 
forcibly removed her.   
 Nevertheless by letter dated September 19, 1991, Funk 
wrote to Nelson stating that she was no longer permitted on 
campus due to her termination as an Upsala College employee.2  
                     
2
.  The letter stated: 
 
 Please understand that Upsala College has a 
properly constituted Gospel Choir under the 
direction of a newly appointed adjunct 
faculty member. 
 
 No other singing groups concentrating upon 
gospel music have been, or will be, 
authorized.  Your presence, last evening, in 
Christ Chapel constituted a trespass of 
College property. 
 
 The meeting, consisting at least of Upsala 
students, was clearly for religious and 
musical purposes, and, whether or not it 
might have been called a rehearsal, or a 
gospel choir, was the equivalent of a gospel 
choir rehearsal.  The result was that the 
meeting constituted an unauthorized rehearsal 
of an unauthorized group conducted by an 
unauthorized trespasser. 
 
 Under the terms and conditions of your 
separation agreement from last year, you have 
  
Freyberger also wrote Nelson that she was no longer permitted on 
campus and that it would be necessary for her to obtain prior 
approval from Upsala before entering its campus. 
 Despite the letters, Nelson visited the Upsala campus a 
number of times after September 1991.  For instance, in October 
of 1991, Nelson accompanied Gospel Choir members and other 
students in a protest against the Upsala administration over 
several issues, including her termination as choir director.  
Nelson also appeared on campus without authorization in February 
1992 to lead the "Former Upsala College Gospel Choir" in a 
"Gospel Sing Fest."  Funk attended this event and saw Nelson.  
Upsala, however, did not remove Nelson from the campus or take 
(..continued) 
agreed to 'do everything within (your) power 
to effect the spirit and intent of this 
agreement.'  This included your renunciation 
of all future employment, and it remains the 
intention of the college that you not be 
involved here in any way. 
 
 You have also agreed that you 'will not at 
any time disparage Upsala . . . or (its) 
officers.' 
 
 Under no circumstances are you to return to 
the campus except by my explicit invitation. 
 
 The security force has been instructed to 
remove you should you appear again. 
 
Appellees' app. at 19ABa.  Funk wrote this letter after 
discussing Nelson's appearance with Karsten and Freyberger.  
According to Funk, he wrote the letter because he viewed Nelson's 
actions as a deliberate attempt to interfere with Beverly Owens' 
direction of the choir and as a breach of the settlement 
agreement.   
  
other actions against her when she appeared on campus after her 
termination. 
 On September 27, 1991, Nelson filed a second 
discrimination charge with the EEOC alleging that Upsala 
retaliated against her for filing the earlier charge with the 
EEOC.  The EEOC dismissed the second charge on February 14, 1992.  
Nelson then filed a complaint in the district court alleging that 
Upsala engaged in conduct constituting unlawful retaliation under 
section 704(a) of Title VII, the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination, and the New Jersey Conscientious Employee 
Protection Act.  Furthermore, Nelson asserted a state-law cause 
of action for defamation alleging that during Nelson's last year 
of employment at Upsala Freyberger told a student or students 
that Nelson stole money from Upsala and defrauded it by 
submitting a false petty cash voucher.  After Nelson filed the 
district court complaint, Freyberger made a similar statement to 
his secretary and members of his professional staff.  By 
stipulation Nelson in effect amended her complaint to add a 
defamation claim predicated on this republication.  Nelson also 
asserted a state-law claim that the alleged retaliatory conduct 
constituted a material breach of the settlement agreement by 
Upsala.   
 Upsala ultimately moved for summary judgment.  On June 
24, 1994, the district court granted this motion on the claims of 
defamation and unlawful employment retaliation under Title VII.  
The court, however, refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over Nelson's remaining state-law claims.  The court concluded 
  
that Nelson did not demonstrate a prima facie case of unlawful 
retaliation under Title VII because she failed to demonstrate 
that she suffered an adverse employment action.  Additionally, 
the court determined that Nelson's defamation claim was barred by 
the New Jersey statute of limitations.  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-3 
(West 1987).   
 Nelson has appealed from the order of June 24, 1990.  
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
 II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW  
 When considering an appeal from the grant of summary 
judgment, we exercise plenary review.  See Petruzzi's IGA 
Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 554 (1993).  Therefore we must 
determine whether the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits demonstrate that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that Upsala is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Allegheny Int'l, 
Inc. v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 40 F.3d 1416, 1423 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
 
 III.  ANALYSIS 
 A.  Nelson's Unlawful Retaliation Claim 
 1.  The "Pre-Approval" Requirement 
  
 Nelson argues that Upsala's requirement for prior 
approval for her to visit the campus was an unlawful retaliation 
for the first charge she filed with the EEOC.  She then contends 
that the district court erred in ruling that she failed to make 
out a prima facie case of retaliation on the basis of its 
conclusions that she did not demonstrate that she suffered an 
"adverse employment action," which the court defined as "any 
action which already has impaired or which might impair the 
employee in future employment situations."  Nelson maintains that 
she can establish a retaliation case without demonstrating that 
she suffered an adverse employment action as defined by the 
district court.  She contends that actionable retaliation 
includes all conduct that "arises out of or is related to the 
employment relation."  Thus, in her view, the conduct need not 
impair an "employment situation."  Brief at 11. 
 Upsala counters that the requirement that Nelson 
receive prior approval for campus visits does not constitute an 
adverse employment action within section 704 and that a plaintiff 
must suffer an adverse employment action to establish a 
successful retaliation case.  Moreover, Upsala asserts that 
Nelson failed to produce evidence demonstrating that there was a 
causal connection between her filing of the original EEOC charge 
and the alleged retaliation. 
 Section 704(a) of Title VII provides in pertinent part: 
  It shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer to 
discriminate against any of his 
employees . . . because he has made 
a charge, testified, assisted, or 
  
participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or 
hearing under this subchapter. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 To establish discriminatory retaliation under Title 
VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she engaged in 
activity protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took an adverse 
employment action against her; and (3) there was a causal 
connection between her participation in the protected activity 
and the adverse employment action.  Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of 
Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 201 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 590 
(1994); Weiss v. Parker Hannifan Corp., 747 F. Supp. 1118, 1128 
(D.N.J. 1990); see also Robinson v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. 
Auth., 982 F.2d 892, 895 n.1 (3d Cir. 1993).  Nelson's proofs 
clearly satisfy the first of the above-named elements, for it is 
settled that a cause of action exists pursuant to Title VII when 
an employer has retaliated against an employee for filing a 
charge with the EEOC.  Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elect. & Gas Co., 
568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Fuchilla v. Prockop, 682 F. Supp. 
247 (D.N.J. 1987).   
 The district court, however, held that Upsala did not 
violate Title VII because Nelson did not present proofs 
satisfying the second element.  In other words, Nelson failed to 
show that she suffered an adverse employment action.  
Accordingly, the court ruled that Nelson failed to demonstrate a 
prima facie case of unlawful retaliation under Title VII.  The 
court reached this conclusion because (1) Upsala imposed its pre-
  
approval requirement after Nelson's employment had ended, and (2) 
Upsala's actions did not affect Nelson's prior or future 
employment.  Moreover, the court indicated that Upsala did not 
enforce the requirement even when its representatives saw Nelson 
on campus. 
 In support of her contention that she suffered an 
adverse employment action, Nelson relies on our opinion in 
Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d at 194.  In Charlton, a 
school teacher who claimed that she was terminated from her 
employment because of sexual discrimination filed a Title VII 
action in the district court.  Subsequently, the school board 
initiated proceedings to have her state teaching certificate 
revoked.  The teacher then advanced a retaliation claim alleging 
that the board initiated the revocation proceeding in response to 
her original Title VII complaint.  The district court dismissed 
the retaliation claim, ruling that the teacher was not an 
"employee" at the time the board initiated the revocation 
proceedings.  Consequently, it held that she was not entitled to 
protection under section 704.  Charlton, 25 F.3d at 197.   
 On appeal, we reversed the district court and 
determined that a former employee may sue for retaliation under 
Title VII.  In doing so we stated in pertinent part: 
  [A]n ex-employee may file a 
retaliation action against a 
previous employer for retaliatory 
conduct occurring after the end of 
the employment relationship when 
the retaliatory act is in reprisal 
for a protected act within the 
meaning of section 704 and arises 
  
out of or is related to the 
employment relationship. 
Id. at 200.  Nelson relies on this holding to support her 
assertion that she suffered an adverse employment action.     
 Nelson, however, misconstrues Charlton.  That case does 
not hold that all post-employment activity of an employer aimed 
at a former employee in response to her having brought or 
participated in a Title VII proceeding is actionable under 
section 704.  Rather, Charlton simply holds that a former 
employee has standing to bring a retaliation suit under section 
704.3  Thus, Nelson is incorrect when she asserts that Charlton 
"in sweeping terms" prohibited all retaliation "which 'arises out 
of or is related to the employment relationship.'"  Brief at 18.  
Indeed, if anything, Charlton suggests that post-employment 
conduct, to give rise to a retaliation complaint, must relate to 
an employment relationship.  Charlton makes this implication by 
indicating that "courts . . . have extended anti-retaliation 
protection . . . where the retaliation results in discharge from 
a later job, a refusal to hire the plaintiff, or other 
professional or occupational harm."  Charlton, 25 F.3d at 200.  
But as Charlton is not conclusive on this point we look beyond 
                     
3
.  Charlton holds that there should be a two-step analysis to 
determine whether an allegation of post-employment retaliation is 
actionable under section 704.  Such an analysis inquires whether 
the post-employment retaliatory conduct is (1) in reprisal for a 
protected activity and (2) arises out of or is related to the 
employment relationship.  Charlton, 25 F.3d at 200.    
  
that case to determine the type of an employer's post-employment 
conduct prohibited under Title VII.4 
 The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he objective of 
Congress in the enactment of Title VII . . . was to achieve 
equality of employment opportunities . . . ."  Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429, 91 S.Ct. 849, 853 (1971).  See 
Shehadeh v. Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co., 595 F.2d 711, 721 
(D.C. Cir. 1978).  Therefore, for Title VII protections to apply, 
there should be some connection between the allegedly retaliatory 
conduct and an employment relationship.  Although "[t]he 
connection with employment need not necessarily be direct,"5 it 
does not further the purpose of Title VII to apply section 704 to 
conduct unrelated to an employment relationship.  As the court 
indicated in Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 493 (7th Cir. 1991), 
                     
4
.  In her brief Nelson sets forth that she "believes that the 
actions taken against her have had adverse employment 
consequences in the sense the district court meant."  She 
indicates that she did not develop the facts along these lines as 
Upsala did not seek summary judgment on the basis on which the 
district court granted it.  Thus, she contends that the district 
court "erred in failing to provide [her with] an opportunity to 
address the facts suddenly made dispositive by the new rule [the 
court] fashioned."  Brief at 12 n.8. 
 
 We reject this contention.  While it is true that 
Upsala filed its brief in the district court on its motion for 
summary judgment before we decided Charlton and that it contended 
in the brief that the termination of Nelson's employment in 
itself barred this action, Upsala also argued that Nelson was not 
adversely affected by Upsala's conduct.  Thus, Nelson had an  
incentive to demonstrate that Upsala had injured her in 
employment relationships. 
5
.  Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880, 883 (9th 
Cir. 1980). 
  
section 704 requires that the employee demonstrate some type of 
"employment impairment that evidences actionable retaliation."  
 In view of Congress's objective in enacting Title VII, 
it is not surprising that cases dealing with unlawful retaliation 
under Title VII typically involve circumstances in which the 
defendant's conduct has impaired or might impair the plaintiff in 
employment situations.  See Lazic v. University of Pennsylvania, 
513 F. Supp. 761, 765, 767-69 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (deletion of 
positive references from personnel file after EEOC charge filed); 
Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1507-08 (11th Cir. 1988) 
(unfavorable reference for a former employee by former employer 
after EEOC filed);  Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 
F.2d 1162, 1163-64 (10th Cir. 1977) (potential future employer 
informed of circumstances of discharge and a letter of reference 
modified to reflect that the former employee had filed sexual 
discrimination charges);  EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 
1087 (5th Cir. 1987) (discontinuance of severance benefits after 
EEOC charge filed);  Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052, 
1054 (2d Cir. 1978) (former employer refuses to issue letter of 
recommendation and made negative and untrue remarks about 
plaintiff to prospective employer); Sherman v. Burke Contracting, 
Inc., 891 F.2d 1527, 1529 (11th Cir.) (former employer persuaded 
subsequent employer to terminate former employee who had filed 
EEOC charge), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943, 111 S.Ct. 353 (1990).  
Furthermore, Charlton itself involved activity which would have 
impaired the employee in future employment situations inasmuch as 
  
a teacher needs a state certificate to teach in the public 
schools in New Jersey.6 
 Our reading of section 704 does mean that a former 
employee will be without a remedy for an employer's significant 
wrongful post-employment conduct not touching an employment 
relationship.  For instance, if an employer physically assaults a 
former employee or burns down her house in retaliation for the 
employee having brought a Title VII charge, relief might not be 
available under section 704.  However, in such cases the former 
employee could assert a state-law damage claim.7  In fact, 
Nelson's defamation claims are an example of a former employee 
seeking relief in a common law action for conduct which the 
employee herself characterizes as retaliatory.  Thus, if 
Freyberger really defamed her she does not need a section 704(a) 
retaliation action to obtain relief. 
                     
6
.  Thus, in Charlton we indicated that the school board's act of 
pursuing decertification amounted to an adverse employment action 
because the board attempted to influence the administrative 
process "to the detriment of Charlton's employment 
opportunities."  Charlton, 25 F.3d at 201.  Accordingly, Charlton 
also supports the view that an adverse employment action involves 
some harm to an employee's employment opportunities. 
7
.  See, e.g., Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 492-93 (7th Cir. 
1991) (reviewing plaintiff's allegations that her former employer 
physically attacked, shot at, and threatened her).  We recognize 
that it might be argued that it is necessary to permit 
retaliation claims for actions unrelated to an employment 
relationship so that employees are not discouraged from bringing 
Title VII claims or assisting in their prosecution.  We believe, 
however, that the possibility that the denial of a retaliation 
claim for conduct not related to an employment relationship will 
discourage Title VII activity is slight because serious 
retaliatory conduct unrelated to an employment relationship will 
be actionable under state law. 
  
 Our holding is consistent with the language of section 
704 as that section interdicts "an unlawful employment practice" 
rather than conduct in general which the former employee finds 
objectionable.  The words "employment practice" suggest that the 
retaliatory conduct must relate to an employment relationship.  
Upsala's pre-approval requirement was not an "employment 
practice" inasmuch as Nelson was not Upsala's employee when the 
requirement was imposed and the requirement had no impact on 
Nelson's actual or proposed employment anywhere else.   
 Nelson cites Passer v. American Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 
322 (D.C. Cir. 1991), and Baker v. Summit Unlimited, Inc., 855 F. 
Supp. 375 (N.D. Ga. 1994), in support of her position.  But these 
cases do not help her.  In Passer the court ruled that under the 
retaliation provision contained in the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d), the cancellation of an 
honorary symposium in retaliation for the filing of an EEOC 
charge was not only humiliating, but also would hamper the 
plaintiff in procuring future employment.  Passer, 935 F.2d at 
331.  Thus, a cause of action for retaliation was appropriate.  
Therefore, Passer supports a holding that an adverse employment 
action within section 704 requires a harm which impedes 
plaintiff's employment situation.   
 In Baker, the district court ruled that an employer's 
denial of access to its child care center to the plaintiff was an 
adverse employment action.  The plaintiff, a former employee of 
the defendant, apparently was employed by parents to pick up 
children at the defendant's premises.  Central to the district 
  
court's decision was the fact "that the refusal to allow 
[p]laintiff to pick up children in the same manner as other 
parents may constitute an adverse employment action since it may 
impact on her ability to perform this service and thereby 
decrease her income correspondingly."  Baker, 855 F. Supp. at 377 
(emphasis supplied).  This language is consistent with the long 
line of cases suggesting that the challenged conduct in a section 
704(a) retaliation case must affect the plaintiff's employment 
situation. 
 In view of the foregoing analysis, we hold that the 
district court correctly concluded that Upsala's requirement that 
Nelson obtain its approval before entering its campus could not 
give rise to a retaliation claim as the requirement had no impact 
on any employment relationship that Nelson had, or might have in 
the future.  Thus, we will affirm the order for summary judgment 
on the section 704 retaliation claim to the extent Nelson based 
the claim on the pre-approval requirement. 
 
 2.  Defamatory Remarks 
 Nelson next contends that two allegedly defamatory 
remarks by Freyberger constitute an adverse employment action.  
The first was in December 1990 when Freyberger received a petty 
cash voucher which Nelson submitted but which a student 
delivered.  The following conversation, which Nelson 
characterizes as the first defamatory publication, followed the 
submission of the voucher: 
   .   .  . 
  
 
 FREYBERGER:  What do you want from me? 
 
 STUDENT:  Well they won't take [the voucher] 
at the business office. 
 
 FREYBERGER:  First of all, I am no longer 
responsible for the gospel choir.  And, 
second of all, when somebody signs [the 
voucher] as recommended, . . . if they are 
not entitled to sign, it is tantamount to 
stealing from the college. 
Appellant's app. at 98 (emphasis added).   
 The second remark, an alleged republication of the 
above emphasized language, occurred in early 1993 after this 
action was filed.  Nelson contends that Freyberger discussed the 
allegations contained in her complaint with his staff, thereby 
republishing the allegedly defamatory remarks.8  
                     
8
.  Freyberger summarized the circumstances of the republication 
in an affidavit: 
 
 Sometime subsequent to the commencement of 
this lawsuit by plaintiff, in connection with 
preparation for and scheduling my deposition, 
I discussed plaintiff's allegation in her 
complaint with my secretary, Beth Smucker.  
In connection with preparing for my 
deposition, I also had to review documents, 
including petty cash vouchers, and 
information maintained in the offices of 
Director of College Center Craig Allard and 
(former Chaplain now) Dean of Residents 
Charles Leonard.  I advised them that I was 
accused of calling the plaintiff a thief but 
denied I did so.  I may have told one or more 
of them that what I actually stated was what 
I set forth in paragraph [four of my 
affidavit], i.e. that her act was tantamount 
to stealing from another College budget to 
benefit the Choir. 
 
Appellee's app. at 23. 
  
 The district court rejected Nelson's claim that 
Freyberger's remarks gave rise to an actionable claim for 
unlawful retaliation under Title VII.  In doing so, the court 
noted that Nelson failed to offer any evidence that these remarks 
had any adverse effect on her future employment.  We agree with 
the conclusion of the district court and, in view of our earlier 
discussion, we need not consider this claim further. 
 
 B.  Nelson's Supplemental State-Law Claims 
 Nelson pleaded a number of claims under New Jersey law 
but the district court in the exercise of its discretion under 28 
U.S.C. § 1367(c) declined to exercise jurisdiction over most of 
them.  The court did consider one of Nelson's defamation claims 
but granted Upsala summary judgment on it because the action was 
barred by the statute of limitations.  The record, however, 
indicates that the parties entered into a stipulation providing 
that although the first publication apparently was time barred, 
the claim predicated on Freyberger's republication was timely.  
The district court may not have been aware of this stipulation as 
it seems only to have considered Freyberger's original remarks.  
Upsala argues that we nevertheless should affirm the summary 
judgment on the defamation claims on the merits.9   
 We decline to consider the defamation claims.  The 
district court seems to have exercised supplemental jurisdiction 
                     
9
.  We probably could affirm the summary judgment on the first 
publication but because Upsala does not distinguish between the 
two publications in its argument that we should affirm on the 
merits we will not do so. 
  
over the defamation claim arising from the first remark because 
the proper disposition of the claim appeared rather obvious.  
Indeed, the court disposed of the claim in a short paragraph in 
its opinion.  Now, however, Upsala urges that we affirm the 
summary judgment on more complex grounds.  While Upsala's 
substantive contentions might be correct, we conclude that there 
is no reason for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in 
this case as summary judgment is being granted on the federal 
claim.10 
  
 IV.  CONCLUSION 
 For the aforementioned reasons, we will affirm the 
district court's order of summary judgment of June 24, 1994, on 
the unlawful retaliation claim arising under Title VII.  However, 
we will vacate the summary judgment on the defamation claim and 
will remand the case to the district court to dismiss that claim 
without prejudice.  Finally, we will affirm the order of the 
district court declining to exercise jurisdiction over the 
remaining state law claims.   
                     
10
.  Nelson urges us to reverse the district court's order 
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 
remaining state-law claims if we reverse the summary judgment on 
the retaliation claim.  This point is now moot. 
